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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

is the Response Brief of Respondents-Cross-Appellants Lemhi County (the
"County"), et al. The County agrees with the first two portions of Appellant Brian Sopatyk's
statement of the case (nature of the case and course of the proceedings) in his Opening Brief
issue with some

County

allegations, and conclusions set out in Mr.

statement
Idaho law, public roads
blanket legislative action (for roads

instead

following brief statement of facts.

be created in any

foHowing ways:! (1) by

public use prior to 1881), (2) by formal action of the
(public use and malmten,mc:e, or just public use
of acceptance
to

positive

2

The last way

is similar to the second (formal dedication), but is a more lax standard.
County found that Anderson Creek Road ("ACR") qualifies as a public road under
road creation tests. It validated approximately 8,500 feet (about a mile and a

each of the

half) of ACR from Gibbonsville to the Salmon National Forest. The District Court upheld the
decision on the basis of blanket legislative action and common law dedication, and found it
to reach the remaining theories.

33 (Memorandum Decision at 10).

This case is the natural sequel to Farrell v. Bd. o/County Comm'rs o/Lemhi County, 138
Idaho 378,64 P.3d 304 (2002), and Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008).

I In addition to these, public roads may be created by express conveyance or express dedication through the
platting process. This did not occur here.

2 The full citation is: An Act Granting the Right-of-way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over the Public Lands
and for Other Purposes, also known as the Mining Act of 1866, also known as Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14
Stat. 251,253 (1866) (previously codified at Revised Statutes § 2477 (1873) ("R.S. 2477"), re-codified at 43 V.S.c.
§ 932 (1938», repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA") § 706(a), Pub. lines No. 94579,90 Stat. 2743,2793 (1976).
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Farrell defined the legal mechanisms for road creation, notably articulating the

standard

RS. 2477 roads and recognizing common law dedication in the context of public lands.

Galli addressed the important question of how much evidence is required to establish a public
road. Galli recognized that
lat~nCe

of public use,

validations of ancient Idaho roads, there is rarely much "direct
in the proper case, public use may be inferred from
there is

evidence and

a transportation network serving a thriving, turn-ofas far

as

....,"J.H••' V U ,

England.

used
runs

hunters,

Mr. Sopatyk,

blocked all public access.
record contains substantial evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that
ACRhas been

public use at least since the creation of the Gibbonsville townsite

in 1878. It originally served as Main Street (running north-south) in this early mining
boomtown.
a

it continued north along Anderson Creek, serving as the main "wagon
to a

network of mines.

Another street, then called Percy Street, ran perpendicular (east-west) through
Gibbonsville.
When hydraulic placer mining undermined parts of the original townsite in about 1897,
the town moved to the east, and former Percy Street became the new Main Street. Despite the
relocation of the town following the washout, ACR continued to serve as the main "wagon road"
serving the mining community (running north-south along Anderson Creek).

RESPONSE BRIEF
1007368_39.5720·9

Page 7 of 103

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL

The first four items in Mr. Sopatyk's statement of issues on appeal are a paraphrasing of
the standards of review under Idaho Code § 40-208(7). Although correctly stated, their recitation
does little to assist the Court in understanding the issues on appeaL Accordingly, we offer the
following summary

issues.

Who bears the burden of proof?
established by

UUMlJA""

legislative declaration

1881 as shown by (l) the

1878 townsite petition and (2) history of extensive mining before 1881?
established by

the

LVLJ,LUH

1892

realignment?
1893 or by
use

maintenance after 1

Was

established by common

dedication as shown by the 1897 patent and

accompanying plat and survey notes?
Was ACR established pursuant to R.S. 2477 and, specifically, does the 1878 petition
and the 1

realignment show that

road meets the "some positive act" test?

abandonment?

8.

alleged encroachment onto federal land make any difference?
to validate

10.

feet wide?

County's findings as to the local public interest sufficiently articulated?
Mr.

11.

allegations

as to a prior County Commissioner have any

bearing on this matter?
12. Should attorney fees be awarded to either party?

RESPONSE BRIEF
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ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL

The County seeks reversal ofthe denial of attorney fees by the District Court It also
seeks attorney fees on this appeaL The basis of the County's claims and its objection to Mr.
Sopatyk's claim for attorney

is set out in section IV at page 42.
ARGUMENT

I.

WAS CREATED AS A PUBLIC ROAD.

was used by the public prior to 1881, and therefore became a
public road by operation of legislative declaration in 1881.
blanket declarations of public roads by Territorial Legislature. 3
1881 statute matters
1

and there is ample
or highways laid out or now traveled, or which

1 statute

have been commonly used by the pUblic ... are hereby declared county roads .... " Gen. Laws
of the Territory of Idaho, at

277, § 1 (1881). There was no requirement of public maintenance

and no minimum number of

that the road be in public use. Thus, if the facts show that

was

VVl.UU.1VHLY

used

public on or "'",1",....... 1881,

by operation oflaw. The County so found

road became a public road

5 (January 24,2005, Findings a/Fact and

Conclusions a/Law ("Findings"» at 7, Finding Nos. 46 and 47) as did the District Court.
The evidence shows that ACR was in existence in 1878 when miners in the Dahlonega
Mining District met to establish the Gibbonsville Townsite. The evidence is found in a petition,
signed by the president of a committee of miners, which was submitted to and recorded by the
Dahlonega Mining District, Lemhi County, Idaho Territory on August 12, 1878. Ex. 3, C-5
(Minutes, Townsite ofGibbonsviHe; Ex. 3, C-4 (Plat of Gibbonsville». The petition recites the

3 Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, at p. 578, § I (1864) (repealed); Compiled and Revised Laws of the
Territory ofIdaho, at p. 677, § 1 (1875) (repealed); Gen. Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, at p. 277, § 1 (1881)
(repealed). An 1885 statute recognized the prior blanket declarations, but did not contain another such blanket
declaration. Gen. Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, at p. 162, § 1 (1885) (repealed).

RESPONSE BRIEF
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events of a miners' meeting on August

1878, in which a new townsite was approved on

Anderson Creek. The third paragraph noted expressly: "The road up Anderson Creek to be left
open .... " The eighth paragraph recited: "That the street up Anderson Creek be called Main
Street and the other Percy Street." The minutes were accompanied by a "Plat of Gibbonsville"
Street

ft

(Plat of

and

was to

uncontroverted, and direct

IS

in existence

The only thing remaining is inference
was

aOICmneIlt

Imm~~Qlate

activity to justify creation

a

substantial mining activity

area
t'rCIS1)lectlmg continued in the Gibbonsville area, and by
continuing strikes of gold set off a
Idaho. '"
gold brought some experienced
nrr."r,,"£"'!',nr" into the Gibbonsville area, one of whom was
Anderson of Leesburg, Idaho. On August 10, 1877,
claims, and one which later turned
out to be
richest,
the north slope of Dahlonega Creek on
the east outskirts of the Gibbonsville Townsite. These claims later
,",LU.LUt.,,,, of the American Development and
Reduction Mining Company (A & M). On September 5, 1877,
Frank and
Tingeley located claims that later became the Twin
Brothers Mine, just to the southeast of Gibbonsville along the
south slope of Dahlonega Creek .. " The third most important
mine in the Gibbonsville area was the Clara Morris located along
the east slope of Anderson Creek, about 1Yz miles north of the
Gibbonsville Townsite. This mine produced an estimated

4 Mr. Sopatyk states in his Opening Brief at 9-10, "There is no evidence that any actual road was built
before or in 1878 or that it was used." Rather than address the evidence upon which the County and the District
Court expressly relied, Mr. Sopatyk continues to ignore the evidence and misstate the record on this appeaL Failing
to respond to evidence and arguments that have been laid out repeatedly below and stating instead that the County
provided only "conclusory statements" that "do not qualify as evidence," Opening Brief at 10, falls short of the duty
of candor that Mr. Sopatyk and his counsel owe the Court.
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$250,000 ....
In 1878, the miners in the Gibbonsville area formed the
Dahlonega Mining District ... , !y!s!§.LQ!J~1lli~~~~~!lli!
the lode veins had been found by the end of 1877, before the
~~~~~~~~~ ... Also during 1878, Ira Tingeley
and Frank Carey built the first quartz stamp mill for the Twin
Brothers Mine,
the first hard-rock mining was underway at
Gibbonsville.
In 1881, Messrs. Johnson, Walker & Co. of London,
seven
claims that were originally found by
Anderson, along with a 10-stamp mill for $250,000.
",aM"'''''',",

Years at 78-80) (emphasis supplied).
Gibbonsville had its beginnings in 1877 when placers were
on
Their presence led to the location
of gold-bearing veins in September of that same year. During the
fall, one arrasta was build
two were added the next year.
this means
to
a ton was saved. Early in 1881, most of the
were
to an English company which later
"IUIUat.LVH and sold the property to Adelbert Ames of
" ...."'...,i""'rI them for a number of years.
r>rnlP1!"l""

Not Die), also found at Ex. 4,
contains a map (part of a publication by the U.S.

If that is not ,",u"'u.-.u.

P-8 and Ex. 3, C-20-C (Geology and Ore Deposits at 4

Geological Survey
au",·,,,,...

through the

V'~'V~L~

now

"Wagon

running north-south along Anderson Creek

by Mr. Sopatyk. The road provides access to many of the very

claims mentioned above as being in existence on or about 1877, including the Clara Morris
lJa;:,;:,al';";;

as "third most important mine in the Gibbonsville area").

author does not list the exact date the Clara Morris went in, but it is discussed in the context
others that went in 1877. Moreover, the author states in the quotation above: "Most of
the placer deposits, and the lode veins had been found by the end of 1877 .... " Any doubt that
this mine, directly accessed by ACR, was in place by 1881 or earlier is resolved by a discussion

RESPONSE BRIEF
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in another sonrce describing the Clara Morris as "one of the older ones in the district.

Ex.

20-C (Geology and Ore Deposits at 133).
It is a reasonable inference that mining at the Clara Morris and elsewhere in the
immediate vicinity of ACR must have relied on the main "wagon road" accessing these mines.
Sopatyk's implication,

to

did not just access his property. Unlike the
ona

1881 is not
"'",,''''''',,",UL
tC>"~A',£'

as far away as New

attracted the attention

magnitnde to

and London. (See quotations above.) As the District
could

that the owners

a

to access

unavoidable inference, coupled
petition that the

scattered "cabins

the express statement in the miners' 1

was in existence at the time

is more than sufficient to uphold

"

road up Anderson Creek to be left
conclusion

the road was established

by legislative declaration in 1881. The County is entitled to deference in this factnal
detennination. It cannot be said that the County's conclusion was rendered in the absence
substantial

Galli,

Idaho at 1

1

P .3d at 236.

5 Mr. Sopatyk misstates the holding in Galli. He said, incorrectly, "As held in Galli, there must be an
'express statement' affirmatively proving the existence and use of ACR for five (years) prior to February 20, 1897."
Opening Brief at 19. In fact, this Court held that the evidence need not be express or direct. Rather, public use may
be established by inference based on circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence is strong enough to support the
inference. "Although direct evidence is not required, there must be sufficient circumstantial evidence in support of
any inferences." Galli, 146 at 161, 191 P.3d at 239. In Galli, the Court found that evidence of some "cabins and
fences" in 1902 was insufficient to support an inference that the road in question had been there three years earlier.
The contrast with the case at bar is overwhelming. The Galli case, by the way, arose in a peculiar posture. For no
apparent reason, the proponent of the road presented his case solely on the basis ofR.S. 2477. Lemhi County, in
contrast, considered all five road creation theories.

RESPONSE BRIEF
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noted in footnote 4 at page 10, Mr. Sopatyk fails to grapple with this evidence.
Instead,

responds in two ways.
Mr. Sopatyk contends, "It was also admitted by the county historian that owners of

gold mines did not allow unfettered access into their gold fields by way of public roads."
Opening Brief at
on

,nr,,,nIV

'nnm~"v

and his counsel have not been forthcoming with the Court. The
are no more

unsuccessful effort to

6

built to access

it is hardly plausible that a private road

property with the intent of excluding others would be labeled
It was not unreasonable

"wagon

the County to conclude

lJec::allse it was
access to
of the

pnmary means

by many miners and other

'U'-'UHI..."

mtere:ncie, and there are no facts to the contrary.
a "lack ofland division" somehow undermines the
at 9.

example,
Sopatyk, is a fonn

,",U"HUe",

And,

the land was subdivided. For

carved out of the public domain and now owned by Mr.
course, the lots along

in Gibbonsville were

The full colloquy between
Sopatyk's counsel and the County's historian is as follows:
MR. SAETRUM: Is it normal, from your study of history, to allow the public
unfettered access to a successful mining operation?
MS. BENEDICT: No.
MR. SAETRUJ\1: Would that suggest that the owner would keep the road
private so that the public couldn't wander through there?
MS. BENEDICT: Well, according to the documents that I have, they did not
keep it private."
Ex. 1, p. 87, II. 14-22 (Tr. Public Hearing Sept. 27,2004 ("2004 Hearing"». Having heard from the witness that the
evidence shows the road was not kept private, Mr. Sopatyk's counsel stopped the line of questioning and tumed to
other matters.
6

7 ACR is also described as a "wagon road" in Ex. 4, P-9 (Recorder Herald newspaper report stating, "The
citizens of Gibbonsville have just. completed the survey for a wagon road over the divide into Montana. The route
selected is via Anderson Creek and Three Mile."); Ex. 3, C-l 0 (plat of mill site along Anderson Creek shows ACR
labeled "wagon road"); Ex. 3, C-I (ACR is also referenced in the field notes to Mineral Survey No. 1170 at page 68:
"Edge of wagon road, course southwest and northwest.").
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subdivided. Mr. Sopatyk's point is not only wrong, it is irrelevant. None of the road creation
methods, other than common law dedication, requires subdivision or conveyance ofland.

B.

ACR was created by formal action of the County.
Approval of the 1892 relocation of ACR as a public road
satisfies the "formal action" test.

(1)

the years various Idaho statutes have authorized local governments to create public
roads by official action as they determine appropriate. (See Appendix A.) The operative statute
in this case is the one adopted in 1887. It provided:

years, are highways.
Rev. Stat.

Idaho

§

1

887) (emphasis shows the

action" portion of statute).

In other words, to satisfy this statutory requirement, all that is required is (1) that there be an
order

the county commission recognizing that the road is part of the public road system and

that the order be 7"""(",....rr1,,,{1
on
with the

.LJVLHHA

Petition).

1, 1

County Commissioners. 8

TUT,POHIP

petitioners filed a petition

C-8 (1892 Relocation

petitioners, headed by one Chas. J. Barclay, described themselves as "residents of

Road District No.6.
public roads. However,

petitioners employed a printed

designed for validation of new

petitioners modified the form to request that the location of two

existing roads be adjusted slightly to avoid cutting across a lot.

8 The 1878 miners' petition does not satisfY this statutory requirement for formal action, because the action
was not taken by the County Commissioners. See Ex. 5 (Findings at 7-8, Finding No. 50).
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The petition includes a hand-drawn diagram showing Main Street and Percy Street-the
same streets shown in the 1878 plat. 9 The longer street (Main Street) is shown on the horizontal
axis, while the shorter Percy Street is on a vertical axis. The drawing is not marked to show
which direction is north. The County reasonably concluded that it was drawn in this fashion in
order to fit Main Street into the longer horizontal space available on the page for the drawing.
5, (Findings at 5, Finding No. 28).
This 1

petition was properly recorded

the Lemhi County Road Book, Volume

(Hope Benedict's September 27,2004 Summary of Evidence (first document of Ex. 3)
Summary") at 5). On the same day, the County Commissioners approved the
(Commissioners Mllllutes

approval, likewise, were

(Benedict Summary at
This action was a formal recognition of the public status of the road taken by the County
Commissioners. It was properly recorded. Accordingly, ACR was recognized as a public road
in accordance with section 851.

(2)

Sopatyk denies none of this, but offers four quibbles.

Location versus relocation: A distinction without a difference.

Mr. Sopatyk complains that
1887 statute because, he

relocation does not qualify as a formal action under

rec:ogJl1lzmg an

road as public when it is relocated is

not the same as recognizing a road as public when it is first laid out. Opening Brief at 10-11.
This is a distinction without a difference. 10 The County can find nothing in this Court's

9 The petition referenced "the plat of the town of Gibbonsville on file in the office of the District Recorder."
This may have been the same Plat of Gibbonsville attached to the miners' petition of 1878 (Ex. 3, C-4 and C-5). See
Ex. 5 (Findings at 5, Finding No. 28). Or it may have been another plat. It does not really matter. In any event, the
depiction of Main Street and Percy Street matches the plat set out in Ex. 3, C-4, thus confirming that it is a reference
to the same Main Street (which is also ACR).
10 This Court has complained no fewer than 47 times about such pointless "distinctions without a
difference." E.g., St. Alphonsus Divers~fied Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 495,224 P.3d 1068,
1084 (2010).
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decisions that draws such a tine semantic line. Nor do the words of the statute demand that the
recognition of the road as public be contemporaneous with when it is first "laid out."
The County urges instead a functional reading of this statutory language consistent with
the

practical approach to the law of public access reflected in Farrell, Galli, and so many
an

'VLL'V"~L

declaration in the form

recorded

private property do not
legal opinion, placement on a map,
statute aelnallas formal action and recording by the
recorded order recognizing the
vaU.VB.

IS

constructed

It

the county,

the county (as in Farrell), or upon
The formal, recorded action by the
alteration of the course

nll!-S{)Ulll

satisfies

versus east-west non-issue.
mistaken reference

one-paragraph summary of the County's action

1892 to
approvmg

relocation

the orientation of the roads in
petition

petition

to a Main Street running east-west
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C-9) incorrectly describes

his brief, Mr. Sopatyk says, "The
a Percy Street running north-south .... "
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Opening Brief at 11. This misstates the record. II The 1892 petition (Ex.

C-8) says nothing

about direction. As noted in the County's Findings: "The drawing is not marked to show which
direction is north. As depicted, the longer street (Main Street) is shown on the horizontal axis,
while the shorter Percy Street is on a vertical

It appears to have been drawn in this fashion

longer horizontal

to fit Main Street into

available on the page for the drawing.
is supported by testimony of the

L

Benedict.
other words, north

to

L 16

2004 Hearing).

have been to the left on the petition. Apparently the clerk
was to the top of the page, as it
as

north

Street
minor error

legal consequence. ACR is where it always has

IS

Main Street

been. That 1878

running north-south along Anderson

They are depicted just the same on the 1892

and

plausible conclusion is that the 1892 petition describing Main

petition (Ex.
Street and Percy

to the same streets with the same names as in the

Gibbonsville

1878 plat
''''l,\,..<>hrlr

"Main Street"
Briefat 11

to
Supp.

complains:

is no evidence that in July 1892 the term

running east-west through Gibbonsville." Opening

Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 14-15. This makes no sense. It

! I This is another instance in which Mr. Sopatyk has persisted in misstating the record, despite the fact that
the error was pointed out during the judicial review below. SUpp. c.R., Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 14,
County's Response Brief Below at 18-19.
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was not until several years later that the town was moved to the east and east-west Percy Street
became the new Main Street
This timing is well documented. The record reports in several places that in 1897 and
1898, placer mining undermined part of the original Gibbonsville Townsite. Indeed, this
is what precipitated the emergency trip to Washington,

",,,u'V ••n

to get President
at 81);

(The Golden

Theodore Roosevelt creating the
Gibbonsville on October 30, 1901 is set out in
carne too

LJU'JUlo'J-l

The President's action, however,
mining to necessitate the

damage

east
was rermnleo
Will Not Die), also found at

that

But this did not occur until sometime on or after 1898.

15-C (Over the Back Fence).

Also see,

(The

new

the reference to Main Street in 1

must

original Main Street, also known as

(4)
Mr. Sopatyk persists

Recording of the plat-another non-issue.
another pointless quibble he presented first to the District Court.

It is difficult to understand exactly what his

but

appears to think it is of some

consequence that the 1892 petition refers to "the plat of the town of Gibbonsville on file in the
office of the District Recorder." Opening Brief at 11; Supp.

Sopatyk's Opening Brief

Below at 14. Most likely, the 1892 petition was referring to the 1878 plat discussed above (Ex.
3,

Conceivably some other plat had been created, though none is in the record. But this

makes no difference. The 1887 statute does not require recording of a plat; it only requires
recording of the formal decision recognizing the road as public. The decision documents (Ex. 3,
and C-9) are produced from the official records of the County. Mr. Sopatyk does not dispute
RESPONSE BRIEF
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that they were recorded. Mr. Sopatyk's statement that the statute is not satisfied "because we do
not know what plat was recorded with the District Recorder" (Opening Brief at 1

Supp. C.R.,

Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 15) simply makes no sense.

(5)

Maintenance is not required for an official declaration.

Finally, Mr. .... nr''''Hrv claims that
is no

fonnal action

County in 1892 was inadequate

" Opening Brief at 12; Supp.

Opening

at 1

Sopatyk continues to confuse fonnal declaration

prescriptive use, discussed below. Though they derive from the same statute, these are

was established by prescriptive use.
Public use
1893.

was sufficient to create a public road prior to

same 1887 statute discussed above provides an alternative method of road creation. 12
is reflected in the underlined portion of the statute:
laid out
as highways,
order of a Board
Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five
years, are highways.
Rev. Stat. of Idaho Terr. § 851

887) (emphasis shows "prescriptive use" portion of statute). 13

Until the statute was amended in 1893 to add a maintenance requirement, the only
requirement was a showing of five years of public use. As discussed above in section

at page

12 In the judicial review before the District Court, Lemhi County withdrew its Finding No. 56 (Ex. 5
(Findings at 8), which also premised prescriptive use on the 1864 and 1885 statutes. Supp. C.R., County's Response
Brief Below at 21 n.23. The County also acknowledges that the reference in Finding No. 52 (Ex. 5 (Findings at 8)
to a two-year use requirement is inaccurate. The inaccuracy in these fmdings is of no consequence whatsoever to
the ultimate decision reached by the County with respect to prescriptive use, which is based solely on the 1887,
1893, and modem versions of the statute.

13 This 1887 statute is the operative statute upon which the County relies. Ex. 5 (Findings at 8, Finding No.
54); Supp. c.R., County's Response Brief Below at 21. It is unclear why Mr. Sopatyk discusses an 1885 statute in
his Opening Brief at 12. In any event, his explanation of the 1885 statute is wrong. (See summary of the statute in
Appendix A.)
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9 (blanket declaration), ACR was used by tbe public at least

1878 (the year of the miners'

petition for a townsite saying that the road should be "left open") and served mines in existence
Other evidence in the record shows other mines served by the road in operation

as early as 1

on or before 1888. 14 The 1896 field notes

the placer claims also document settlement along

the
note the
a 60
foot wide road running north. . .. Not only does it mention the
it mentions multiple
saloons, etc. along the course of
the claim--especially course near the south end."
1''''''>I'>''f1(;)

•••

(Benedict Summary at 1) (emphasis omitted).
record shows

town

Gibbonsville continued to thrive for many years

thereafter.
town of Gibbonsville was named
John
Gibbons who defeated Chief Joseph's Nez Perce warriors at the
battle of the Big Hole in 1877, the year gold was discovered. The
Townsite was created by an act of Congress, and in July, 1899,
was patented by Judge Steel. At that time, 1899, there were 29
business houses with improvements worth $36,000 and the
population was 450. During the boom years, it had reached about
3,000.
(The Ghost Town that Will Not Die), also found at

3,

continued to

even after the Gibbonsville Townsite was moved to the east, along Dahlonega Creek-IS

14 The fifth page of Ex. 4, P-4 contains a recorded statement by Frank W. Hunt dated April 27, 1888
describing the Mountain Top and other mines in existence as of that date. The Mountain Top is shown in the map at
Ex. 4, P-8 and is plainly accessible only by ACR.
The U.S.G.S. publication, Geology and Ore Deposits at 133 (Ex. 3, C-20-C), describes the Clara Morris
group as having produced $250,000 "at intervals from 1888 and 1908." The Clara Morris claim also appears in the
map at Ex. 4, P-8 and is also plainly accessed by ACR. As discussed above in section I.A at page 9, the Clara
Morris appears to have been located as early as 1877.
15 "This deeding of town site by the president is simply the culmination of the problems created by placer
mining along Anderson Creek Road-the original Main Street: the washouts, the creation of the Placer Hole from
mining and washouts, and the breaking of the trestle. The original plan for the town development had been
undermined (no pun intended) by the mining efforts of those with placer claims along Anderson Creek. This does
not mean that the Anderson Creek Road was no longer used: it was used to access mining claims, there were cabins
along the road (see affidavit information), the road is designated on subsequent maps, and was used for logging

RESPONSE BRIEF
100736839,5720-9

Page 20 of 103

This is hardly surprising. While the town moved, the mines and mills served by ACR did not
move. All evidence, and the fact that the road is still there today (although much impaired by the
closure caused by Mr. Sopatyk), demonstrates that ACR was used by the public long after it was
Gibbonsville's Main Street.

(2)

r>r"<>~"f>n

1

maintenance. 1

§

After 1893, both public use and maintenance can be shown.
statute was arrlerlOf;Q to
at

Idaho

1

1 (then codified at Rev. Stat.

1; codified today as amended at Idaho Code
course,
dernolllstnlted

mallm:enam~e

IS
hpT,rH'p

V'V'VU<U'V

no

Idaho

40-109(5) and 40-202(3».

to oernOllSU'ate

it

1

(,,",P'<>1'11',"

can be established even

public

a requirement.

Evidence of public maintenance is found
District No.

requirement

the

was included in Road

which received regular road maintenance funding.

5 (Findings at

Findings

3,

8-A,

8-

These records, by and

large, do not reflect exactly which road was worked. However, the fact that ACR (then a
F,J.U,U"' ..U H

uv~",,~a

"wagon road" accessing numerous mines) was included within the district is a

basis to infer that

work was

on

to

extent required. 16

purposes in the 1940s (see Marcus Jordan information), and according to affidavit statements continues to be an
important aspect of Gibbonsville." Ex. 3, (Benedict Summary at 11). See also testimony of Dr. Benedict (Exhibit 1,
p. 44, n. 15-25, p. 48, n. 11-20 (Tr. 2004 Hearing») and her reference to an 1899 plat of a portion of the Gibbonsville
Mining District (Ex. 3, C-12), which continues to depict ACR after washout of approximately 1897.
16 In any event, it is not necessary to show that maintenance occurred every year or throughout the entire
course of the road. "Such maintenance need only consist of work and repairs that are reasonably necessary .... "
Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 16,784, P.2d 339, 346 (1990). "It is not necessary for the county to do work upon a
road that does not need work to keep it in repair or to put it in condition for the public to travel." State v. Berg, 28
Idaho 724, 724, 155 P.968, 969 (1916) (fmding road creation through five years of public use despite no evidence of
public maintenance). "Maintenance need only be work and repairs that are reasonably necessary; it is not necessary
maintenance be performed in each of the five consecutive years or through the entire length of the road." Ada
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 366, 179 P.3d 323,329 (2008). "Very few
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maintenance also may be inferred from the fact that the road survived for so many decades.
This conclusion rpC'llr,'ltTl maintenance is supported by testimony of the County's
historian, Dr. Benedict.
contains ample eVl<1ellce

D.

91,1. 20 to p. 93,1. 7 (Tr. 2004 Hearing). 17 The record also
continued public use. IS

ACR became a public road by common law dedication when the
mineral patent issued.
Common law dedication occurs when a patent issues
referencing a plat or other description showing the road.

In the course

estate development, roads may be dedicated to the public
50-1301 to

governing

addition, however, this Court has
as common
common law aelatc:anon
even when statutory procedures are not

to
followed.

19

roads require work throughout their entire length. Our statute does not require work to be done upon a part of a
highway not needing work" Gross v. McNutt, 4 Idaho 286, 289, 38 P. 935, 936 (1894).
17 Mr. Sopatyk mischaracterizes this testimony in his Opening Brief at 13. He states: "In fact, the expert
testified that her research into the matter revealed that the County
retained on behalf of the County,
did not expend any money to maintain ACR." Dr. Benedict said no such thing. Instead, she explained, consistent
with the County's Findings, that the evidence does not state which roads within Road District No.6 funds were
spend on, and that this is not uncommon.
18 Dr. Benedict's summary of evidence (Ex. 3 (Benedict Summary», Dr. Benedict's summary of public
comments from the 2004 validation hearing (Ex. 5 (Exhibit C to Findings», and the extensive public testimony
discussed in footnote 44 at page 40.
19 For instance, in Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879,655 P.2d 86 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982), a developer filed a
plat in 1909 dedicating a road, which remained unbuilt until the 1960s. Homeowners challenged the 1909
dedication on the basis that it had never been accepted by the city, as required by the platting statute. The Court of
Appeals ruled that common law dedication does not require such compliance.
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At

core, a common law dedication simply requires an "offer" of dedication by the

original owner (often but not necessarily in the form

a plat filing) and "acceptance" reflected

in sales of property pursuant thereto. 2o This Court has offered this summary of the doctrine:
When an owner of land plats the land, files the plat for record, and
sells lots by
to the
a dedication of public
areas indicated by the plat is accomplished.
1

1

1

v.

14 Idaho

908).

often, common

dedication occurs in

context of commercial or residential
open space,
that the
to

1

when the federal government issues a

homestead patent

or Hr""TT"'''' description
LV'-."' ....,

a road, that road is deemed to have

government.

common law .... ""UV'-'LL'"·U occurred when the federal government issued Mineral Patent
No. 28383

Davis et al. in 1897.
Mineral ""'Mr""

retc:::rel1ce to a
within
field notes reference
southwesterly. Road, 60
to the adjacent Mineral

4, S-5).
1187 (Ex.

C-l,

patent was issued
included

running adjacent to Anderson Creek. Likewise, the
at

(feet 148): "Anderson Creek, 3 feet wide, courses S.E.

wide, courses North." The road is also referenced in the field notes
1170 (Ex. 3, C-l) at page 69 (feet 210,270, and 351.4):

20 This sounds a bit like the offer and acceptance provided for under R. S. 2477, discussed in section I.E( 1)
at page 25. Indeed, common law dedication may well be a proper means of "accepting" the federal grant.
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"Edge of road, course northerly. Edge of road, course southerly" [appears to be changed to
"northerly."] and at page 68 (feet 187): "Edge of wagon road, course southwest and northwest."
Mr. Sopatyk disputes none of this. Instead, he rests his argument that no common law
dedication occurred on two points, discussed below?l

(2)
that
not

patents.

to mineral patents,

Homestead patents versus mineral patents: A meaningless
distinction.
only extended common law dedication to homestead patents,
is true, but the same logic Farrell applied to homestead patents applies
convey the entire fee. As the Court said in Farrell, "The

go',enrnn,ent was

it filed and recorded a valid plat. That is
part of the owner to dedicate public areas of the
to Worley Highway Dist. V. Yacht
775 P.2d 111, 116 (1989»). Nothing in the
limited to its facts (homestead patents) as urged
was clear. The homesteading, mining,
west and creating a network of public roads. This

the common
sum,
Ha.yu,,",u

representation

doctrine to a
mineral patents involve conveyances by deed based on an
the original owner that a road will be made available. Thus, when the

21 Mr. Sopatyk made these same points in his argument to the District Court, and the County responded.
Following a pattern, Mr. Sopatyk makes them again here, without so much as acknowledging (much less responding
to) the County's discussion of why he is wrong.
22 In Farrell, the Court re-stated the requirements, speaking broadly in terms of offer and acceptance. "The
elements ofa common law dedication as established by Pullin v. Victor are '(1) an offer by the owner, clearly and
unequivocally indicating by his words or acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to public use, and (2) an
acceptance of the offer by the public. '" Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310 {quoting Pullin v. Victor, 103
Idaho 879, 881,655 P.2d 86, 88 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982».
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federal government issues a patent deed pursuant to a map depicting a road, that road is deemed
to have been dedicated to the public by the federal government. 23
(3)

Lots sold: A misunderstanding of the rule.

Next, Mr. Sopatyk complains, Opening Brief at 19, that there is no showing that lots have
sold with retlere:nce to the plat

this is not true. 24 More importantly, however, Mr.
holding in Farrell.

statement
lots

is met by the issuance of the patent itself.
United States plays the role of the real estate developer. The patentee
a patent

on a land
IS

a

a

subject patent

conveyed

the Farrell Court explained: "That the road was

clearly marked and "'4U'V''-'''-'

patent is sufficient to create an offer to dedicate a

public

of homestead patents

a valid acceptance

a

common law dedication." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 385,64 P.3d at 311.

ACR is an R.S. 2477 road.
ACR was created through compliance with state road creation
law.
One of the more interesting areas of road law deals with the creation of rights-of-way
under a federal statute, section 8 of the Mining Act of 1866, commonly referred to as R.S. 2477.

23 Common law dedications often occur without words of dedication. In other words, the plat does not need
to state, "I hereby dedicate this road." As noted above, a dedication may be predicated on "words or acts." Farrell,
138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Typically, the "act" is the depicting of the road on a plat. "[T]he act of filing and
recording a plat or map is sufficient to establish the intent on the part of the owner to make a donation to the public."
Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310; Ex. 5 (Findings at 9, Finding No. 59).
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In this post-Civil War era legislation, the United States government encouraged the creation of a
road network over its vast western estate, forever granting to local authorities ownership of these
rights-of-way. As a result, western states now exercise considerable control over roads located
on federal lands and fonner federal lands.
It all began with a single sentence, described by the Tenth Circuit as "short, sweet, and

"

761

Wilderness Alliance

Oth

2005):

be itfurther enacted,
the right way for the construction
highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby
granted.
§ 8.

statute was to create a

Uv''''-''''UL'UHJlF,

to

construct
with
its own tenns,

offer to the public to

to such rights-of-way to the local

law. 25
applies only to roads

public lands, not reserved for

public uses." Thus, the threshold question in every R.S. 2477 claim

was the land over which

the road lies unreserved public land at the time the road was created? There is no dispute that the
land containing the ACR left the public domain in 1897.26 The evidence discussed above shows
that ACR was in existence well before 1897.

27

24 Again, Mr. Sopatyk misstates the record. For example, Ex. 3, C-6-A is a recording of a town lot sold in
Gibbonsville "joining the Millsite of Strickland & Davis on the East-line fronting the County-road rurming North
100 feet .... " There was only one county road at the time, and certainly only one running north. It was ACR.

25 One might ask, ifR.S. 2477 simply looks to state law to determine whether a road has been created, what
did the federal statute accomplish? The answer is simple: it allowed state roads to be created on federal property.
See discussion in section IILC at page 34.
26 The County found as follows: "The land upon which Anderson Creek Road lies remained in the public
domain until February 20, 1897, the date on which a receiver's certificate was issued to William Davis, et a1.
demonstrating that the application for patent and all accompanying fees and documents were properly filed in
connection with Mineral Entry No. 450." Ex. 5 (Findings at 11, Finding No. 72(A»). Mr. Sopatyk concurs.
Opening Brief at 17.
27 Mr. Sopatyk appears to be confused on this point. He refers to the law in existence as of the year the
land left the public domain. "The Commissioners have the burden to show compliance with the road creation
statutes in existence in 1897." Opening Brief at 17. Of course, the County has shown that. But it has also shown
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Although R.S. 2477 is a federal statute, the law is well settled that state law governs how
the federal offer is accepted. Galli, 146 Idaho at 1

160, 191 P.3d at 233,

("State law

governs whether a highway has been created under R.S. 2477.").
That state law rule is easily stated: "Under
the state road creation statute or where there
1

at

CHBltlOllS

2477 a public road may be created under

a positive act of acceptance by the local
at 310

Idaho at

119

omitted».

The discussion above also shows that ACR has complied with four forms of Idaho road
OJLUHU',"'

legislation,

one

LV . .,LU,",

approval,

use, and common

is

to 1

left

public domain.

the alternative, ACR met the more "lax" test for R.S. 2477.

(2)

(a)

The 1878 townsite petition.
were not enough, ACR also meets the more

strict compliance with state road

relaxed standard of "some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities." Kirk

v. Schultz,

Idaho 278,282-83, 119

266,268 (l

this

said, "[T]he second

method requiring any 'positive act' is more

than the requirements set forth in the state road

creation statute." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,

P.3d at 310.

compliance with the state law in existence in 1881 (blanket legislation) and 1887 (prescription and formal action),
any of which is snfficient to create an RS. 2477 road. In other words, the road may be created under state law in
effect at any time prior to the land leaving the public domain.
28 Since acceptance of a road under RS. 2477 is governed by state law, it would seem that either state
statutory or common law (common law dedication) would suffice. It is not clear why this Court in Farrell and Galli
referred only to statutory law or "some positive act." The County suggests the more logical rule is statutory or
common law or some positive act. In any event, there are plenty of legal theories to justify recognition of ACR
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The County relied on the 1878 townsite petition (which said that ACR should be "left
open") to establish the factual premise that the road was in existence and used by the public for
purposes of road creation under (1) the 1881 blanket legislation, (2) prescriptive use, and (3)
common law dedication. The County did

claim that the 1878 townsite petition constituted
However, the County found that the

1

formal

authorities" sufficient to satisfy
more
for two reasons. First he says: "The miners'

...""nu,..,

can take a positive act to accept the
more
"some
informal

miners' committee may

it was sufficiently authoritative to

one

secure the approval
approved

..," .... '-'l.H

Roosevelt himself when the townsite was

Years at 8

1

positive act or acts on

n ..nn"",

was 1

P.3d at 31

at

Surely that meets the test of "some

public authorities" set out in Farrell, 138 Idaho at
This is how things were done on Idaho's

where

recorded

been

plat was recorded: "[T]he 1878 plat

was never recorded with the County, but 'filed and
Mining District Official Ledger. '" Opening Brief at 21. This is even

more pointless. The "positive

test

not require any recording, so there is not much point

29 In the course of this discussio~ Mr. Sopatyk contends: "In fact, it was testified at the September 27,
2004, hearing that ACR was not included in the township survey submitted and approved in 1901. 2004 Transcript,
p. 98, 1I. 7-19." Opening Brief at 18. Be that as it may, there is ample evidence of ACR on other maps, documents,
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in debating where it was recorded. In any

avoiding arguments over such things as the
and Farrell decisions. 3o

technicalities of recording wa<; the whole point of the

(b)
In any

The 1892 relocation petition.

even if the Court deems the 1878 miners' petition insufficient to meet the
the 1

IS

road relocation petition and approval by Lemhi
is no credible argument

51
--0""""'"

positive

recoguizing the existence of ACR as a

',,''''''''-'(fV does not even address this point.

public

NO EVIDENCE OF ABANDONMENT.

road abandonment requires affirmative proof of both non-use
non-maintenance.
In order to
that

decision validating ACR, this Court must conclude not

"IJ'aVJ,U

created as a public road, but that it has not been abandoned. There
Idaho: formal abandonment (by official act) and passive

are two types

non-maintenance over time.

is no evidence

Sopatyk contends, however, that passive abandonment

no
has occurred.
Idaho's
worked or used

abandonment statute was adopted in 1887. It provided in full:
the period

road not

years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever.

and testimony. In any event, what happened in 1901 has nothing to do with the question of whether the 1878
townsite petition constituted "some positive act."
30 In Farrell, the plaintiff contended that Lemhi County's decision to accept the road was not properly
recorded. The Court brushed aside the statutory requirement for recording. The Court's more "lax" standard
allowed the Court to fmd that the County's acceptance of a miners' petition for the road "pasted in the old leatherbound County book" constituted "a clear manifestation of an intent to accept a road"-irrespective of whether it was
properly recorded. Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310.
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Rev. Stat. ofIdaho Terr. § 852 (1887) (later codified at Idaho Code § 40-203(4» (repealed by
1108, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 41

§ 1).31

The phrase "not worked or used" might sound like either would be sufficient to work an
abandonment. However, this Court has made clear that one asserting abandonment must "prove
and "maintenance" elements. Taggart v. Highway

the negative" with reeara to both the
115
IS

again
non-rna]ln",u~,u~'~

a

abandonment.

2002, "Therefore,

and non-use

o/Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 385, 64 P.3d

v.

311

not apply to
two reasons.
there

an argument

created by preseription. 32

the passive abandonment statute only applies to roads

is correct,

is not subject to passive abandonment because
well as by prescription).

Second, it is

settled that roads

passive abandonment. Farrell, 1
by common

dedication

C'TP,,,,t,,.rI

by common law dedication are not subject to

Idaho at 386,64 P.3d at 3
patent

shown above, ACR was
1

(see section

at page

31 The law was substantially limited in 1963
making it inapplicable to roads like ACR accessing
public lands) and repealed in 1993. Those changes are not relevant here, becanse Mr. Sopatyk is asserting
abandonment prior to 1963.
32 The Legislature amended the passive abandonment statute in 1963 to expressly provide that it is
applicable only to roads created by "prescription" (referring to the public use road creation provision). There is an
argument that the 1963 amendment merely codified existing law. After an, it makes some intuitive sense that the
Legislature wonld have intended that abandonment by non-use apply only to roads created by use. This conclusion
is supported by the outcome in Taggart v. Highway Bd.for N. Latah County, 115 Idaho 816, 817, 771 P.2d 37,38
(1989). In Taggart, the Court declined to apply the passive abandonment statute to a road because the road had been
created by formal action, not by "prescription." This occurred despite the fact that the alleged period of non-use and
non-maintenance was prior to 1963. Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain its reasoning, or even to discuss the
1963 amendment. Consequently, it is difficult to tell if this was the intended ruling, or a mistake based on
unfamiliarity with the history of the statute.
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Thus, the only way to abandon a road created by common law dedication is by formal
declaration of abandonment by the county, and there has been none.
C.

Mr. Sopatyk carries the burden of proof on abandonment.

In any event, Mr. Sopatyk has the burden of proving abandonment:
Upon establishment a public road by prescription, the burden
shifts to the opponents of the public road to show a subsequent
ab.:m(lo1J!mc:mt or extinguishment of those rights.

ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 71
reinforced the point

728,

P.3d 863,

(2002)

the Farrell case decided the same

or public road is proven the hlllrr!p'n
once a
abandonment of that road by non-use and nonl1ACUll1.vH.cun,v 1S on
party asserting abandonment.

to state

IS

no

duty to point to evidence proving non-use and nonmaintenance.

the quantum of use required to avoid abandonment is very low.

the

Court said
of use
to prevent a finding
abandonment, a showing of "any continuous use no matter how
slight, by the public, is sufficient."
1

Idaho at

64 P.3d at 311.
Sopatyk offers no evidence of abandonment.

County hired an historian to search out evidence of abandonment. She found none.
found no evidence of road abandonment in my historical research." Ex. 3, (Benedict
Summary at 1).33

33 ACR mayor may not have been moved slightly to avoid the washout caused by placer mining in 1897 or
1898, but any such movement is legally inconsequential. The record does not reflect any re-alignment of ACR. But
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Mr. Sopatyk offered none, either. Instead

evidence, Mr. Sopatyk ofters this statement

to prove non-use: "As discussed throughout this Brief, there is no supported evidence of use on
ACR." Opening Brief at 14; Supp. C.R., Sopatyk's Opening Brief Below at 17. Suffice it to
that is not evidence, and this bald assertion

not come close to meeting his burden of

complete non-use
footnote

at

Response Brief

Mr. Sopatyk still does not
abandonment. Indeed,

five years. Despite having had this

£,<"'·1,..P<2

the burden of proof on

avoids the subject altogether.
Sopatyk

that no

m,nnterlanlce was .... t>'rtr..rrn

maintenance records can
1920

at 1

Opening

Opening

assertion, he offers an affidavit of himself saying that
was no mention of maintenance or

and that

regarding a 'Anderson Creek Road. '"
falls short

at 17.

1

support

reviewed the road maintenance records
for maintenance or use of any kind

4, S-l (Sopatyk Affidavit at p. 1, ~ 7). Again, this

Mr. Sopatyk's burden of affirmatively proving that no maintenance occurred.

even if it were necessary to move the road as a result of the hydraulic mining, this does not change its status as a
public road. In Farrell, opponents of a public road sought to prove non-use based on the fact that the road had been
largely re-aligned along a creek bed, with substantial stretches jumping from one side of the creek to the other. The
Supreme Court squarely rejected this theory: "After 1955, the Ranch Owners allege that the road was not used
because it was relocated by the Forest Service. '" The Ranch Owners based the majority of their non-use
abandoument claim on the non-use of the portions of the road abandoned because of realigmnent. Abandonment of
the old portions of a realigned road, however, is not evidence of non-use or abandonment of the realigned new road
unless the changes actually change the identity of the road originally laid out." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 386, 64 P.3d at
312. This ruling reflects the practical reality in Idaho that mountain roads are routinely re-aligned in response to
washouts and other events. This is consistent with a 1932 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Central Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463,467 (1932). The federal district court in Idaho recently cited this case as
controlling authority on this point. United States ofAmerica v. Boundary County, Case No. CV98-253-N-EJL, at 5
(0. Idaho, Memorandum Decision and Order, Aug. 28, 2000); accord, Sheridan County v. Spiro, 697 P.2d 290,296
(Wyo. 1985); Schultz v. Dept. ofthe Army, u.s., 10 F.3d 649,655 (9 th Cir. 1993).
This is apparently a non-issue. Mr. Sopatyk has not raised it. The County includes this footnote out of an
abundance of caution, and with apologies to the Court, to ensure that it remains a non-issue.
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the facc

circumstantial evidence that public m~lln1:en;an(:e occurred (discussed above in

section LC(2) at page 21), Mr. Sopatyk must do more than say he looked in some books and did
not find specific proof of public maintenance. As the District Court noted, proving nonmaintenance is not easy,34 But that is Mr. Sopatyk's burden, and he has not met it.
MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENTS HAVE NO MERIT.

a litany of throw-away arguments, all
were

""''',1'"v

simply

them again on this

,vu\.!.

':>,,"..

appeal,

to reS1DOlJl<1 to the arguments presented below. The County addresses

m

tum.
County's decision does not constitute a taking or due process
violation.
argument (Opening Brief at 20-21) that the validation of ACR violates his
process and just compensation rights is circular and pointless. If the validation was proper,
obviously, the

was not his and there was no constitutional violation.
be no

was

the validation

,,"Vj,'.:>lHUUVU£tl

violation.
The County's Findings were documented and supported by the
record.
Mr. Sopatyk contends (Opening

at

-22) that the County's Findings were
so. The record provides

fun support for

34 "Admittedly, in making this ftnding [of non-abandonment] the Commissioners to some extent relied on
the absence of proof in proving a negative i.e., non-use and/or non-maintenance. This ftnding implicates respective
burdens of proof." R., p. 30 (Memorandum Decision at 7).
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decision to validate ACR. For the existence of ACR after the washout, see discussion
in footnote 15 at page 20. For continued use to the present times, see footnote 18 at page 22.35
At another point, Mr. Sopatyk complains that the County should have looked at other
evidence. Opening Brief at

The items he lists (tax assessments and deed documents) have

to

In

this was an adversarial proceeding, and

the ACR encroaches on federal lands.
land. Opening Brief at

The

em;;roacJ111lem is a map submitted by
encroachment.
was

~HU'H"~"',

nor was

the

of

35 Mr.
further claims in his
Brief that
not "citing authority for" each particular
paragraph in the Findings, "the Commissioners are only substituting their prejudices and desire in place of actual
facts." Opening Brief at 22. For example, Mr. Sopatyk states there is no citation to the record for Finding No. 43
that ACR ran all the way into Montana. Opening Brief at 21. This is another of Mr. Sopatyk's misleading
assertions as there is no requirement that the Commissioners cite authority for every conclusion. Further, it is
unnecessary for the Commissioners to do so as they already acknowledged at the outset of the Findings that the
entire record before the Commission was considered. Ex. 5, (Findings at 3, Finding Nos. 12 and 15). The record
contains clear support for the County decision, including the conclusion that ACR existed to the Montana border.
4, P-9 (1981 newspaper clipping indicating "citizens of Gibbonsville have just completed the surveyor a wagon
road ... into Montana ... via Anderson Creek and Three Mile."».

Here is the colloquy between counsel for Mr. Sopatyk and Judge Moss:
MR.SAETRUM: And it was interesting ... that there is never an assessment for
the owners of the Anderson Creek placers for any roadwork, yet if indeed that
was a public road, there had to be an assessment.
THE COURT: Why do you say there had to be?
MR.SAETRUM: Well, Ms. Benedict, who was the County's historian, said that
if it was a public road, the people living on it would be assessed to maintain it.
THE COURT: Is that an assumption or is that a law?
MR. SAETRUM: That was her understanding as to how it worked at the time.
THE COURT: But we don't have any ordinances on that effect, anything else
indicating that just that's what she believed?
MR. SAETRUM: Correct.
p. 4, L 19 to p. 5, 1. 12.
36
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Whatever the case, the encroachment issue is improper and irrelevant. It is raised too
late37 and, in any event, Mr. Sopatyk does not speak for the Forest Service and does not have
standing to raise this concern. lfthe Forest Service objects to this road, it has the ability to
protect its interests.

fact, however, the

Salmon-Challis

Service has taken the opposite position. The
expressly supported recognition of ACR as an

R.S.
response to
letter of August 24, 2004 related to the
'1"111"...."1'.'1"1 Creek Road, I would like to express the Salmon-Challis
support for continued public access along this
road.
Anderson Creek Road indicates the
road was established prior to the establishment
of the National Forest.
appears to qualify
designation as a
public road under RS2477.
Although the road tenninates on the National
Forest, it largely passes through and provides access
to public land.
This road is not and has not been considered a
portion of the National Forest road system.
road has not been maintained by the Forest
Service and is unlikely to be a priority for our
available road maintenance funds.
these findings, and the fact that the Salmon-Challis
is one of the landowners along this road, we believe the best
public would be served by designation of the
Anderson Creek Road as a County Road in order to provide
continued access to and through this area to the National Forest.
Wood). That should put this argument to rest.

37 Mr. Sopatyk failed to raise the issue of encroachment during the validation proceedings and "[r]eview on appeal

is limited to those issues raised before the administrative tribunal." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 920,
204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009). "[A]n appellate court will not decide issues presented for the first time on appeal," and
this Court should not now entertain the encroachment argument. Id. (citing Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 40, 714 P.2d 6,9 (1986)).
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that matter, even if the Forest Service opposed the road, that would be of no
consequence. RS. 2477 roads may be created on public land prior to the withdrawal of the land
from the public domain. 38 Indeed, that is the whole purpose ofRS. 2477.
D.

ACR was properly validated as 50-feet wide.

Sopatyk ~.. _,,.., ..~ that

fifty-foot width of ACR is too wide. Opening Brief at 24.

the fifty-foot width is

presumption established by Idaho statute and

facts in the rp('nrrl
Idaho law uses a

is no official declaration or survey to the contrary,
as a default

Code § 40-605; Idaho Code § 40-231
780 (1908), applied the

1

case

39

in a case involving a public
statute.

Court held
circumstances

case, but is presumed to
statute evidently nTrH'''''''''' the width

a road

clearly indicate otherwise. This
is considered reasonably necessary for the

convenience ofthe public generally." Meservey, 14 Idaho at 146,93 P. at 784. "Where there is
no

evidence

mere user

....... "JL,,~.

the presumption is not necessarily

38 Mr. Sopatyk contends, "The County, however, cannot validate a road on federal ground." Opening Brief
at 24 (citing French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950,957,751 P.2d 98, 105 (1998». The French case was speaking
about validation after the land was reserved. Obviously, that cannot be done. Equally obviously, R.S. 2477 roads
can be validated on federal lands if the road became a public road before the land was reserved. To the extent ACR
encroaches on public land, the United States, if it chose, could refuse to acknowledge such a validation absent a
federal quiet title action. If necessary, a federal quiet title action could be pursued here. Given the federal
government's express recognition that ACR qualifies as an R.S. 2477 road and desire to maintain public access via
this road, that is unlikely to be necessary.
39 Predecessors of this statute trace the 50-foot minimum back to territorial days. 1887 Revised Stat. of
Idaho Territory, title VI, ch. II, § 932; 1885 Gen. Laws of the Territory ofIdaho, § 10 at page 165.
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limited to the traveled path, but may be inferred to

£>VT,,,,.,."

to the ordinary width of highways

Meservy, 14 Idaho at 147,93 P. at 784.

. . . . ,,40

Moreover, the Court expressly adopted the common law of Utah, which holds that the
road created by prescription encompasses the public's right "to use the whole tract as a highway,
and the exigencies of the

by widening
at

public

statute

it must
50 feet, and common

Again, the Court emphasized the key point:
the width of highways at not less than

that width no more than sufficient for the proper keeping

PV,r>PT"lpr1PP

Idaho at 1

P. at 785.

prescription was also recognized in State v. Berg,

Idaho

years of public use,

1

portion).
Idaho

The case

..... At..-"'" that the right

IS

broader than

C""'+<>f'A

1088 (1961), demonstrates that
for a public road may be substantially

itself. The Idaho Supreme Court declared: "Mere non-user of a

a highway over a period of years does not constitute an
abandonment, or

public from claiming the title and right to the use thereof" Rich, 83
at 1094. In this case, the state ofIdaho was authorized in widening and

Idaho at
improving a

cr'""'''''''

even where the

was to require the removal (without compensation)

of a gas station owned by the defendant.
Here, the record is replete with evidence that a width of 50 feet is appropriate for ACR.

40

The tenn "user," by the way, is an arcane but correct tenn for "use."
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Relevane
"Road 60 ft. wide" (deseribing ACR)
"Road 60 ft. wide" (describing ACR)

"Main Street 75

wide" (deseribing ACR)

"that the streets be (75) seventy-five teet
(describing ACR)
Obviously, ACR is currently much different both structurally and visually than it was
over one hundred years

Nevertheless,

width and in accordance

is entitled to validate the road based on its
statutory presumption

a fifty-foot width .

.....'U·"',,,,,, determined that validation of ACR is in the
to
was

is not correct.
laid out the two-step process for consideration of the
Commission will

determine whether

Anderson Creek Road meets the requirements ofIdaho law as a public road or right-of-way
today.

that decision is

the

the public mte:rest
5 (Exhibit B to Findings, Notice at

the Commission will next determine whether it is in

1,

1, L 25 to p.

This two-step process is as
subject of public interest evaluation.

or right-of-way."

continue to be a
7

2004 Hearing).

contained a separate heading on the
un-nus",

at 1

Findings Nos. 91, 92, 93). Another

paragraph notes the key public 11'11",,,,,,""""1' {,1"1f""<MAn that ACR provides access to public land. Ex. 5
(Findings at 7, Finding No. 44).41 In addition to these four paragraphs, the Findings incorporated

41 Mr. Sopatyk claims in his brief that this rroding is not supported by the record. Opening Brief at 7.
Again, not true. See bullet point 3 in the Letter of William A. Wood
3, C-3) (quoted in section m.c at page
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Exhibit C which set out eight pages of summary of public interest testimony (Ex. 5 (Exhibit C to
Findings at 1_8».42
In comparison to the County's more detailed discussion on the merits, it must be admitted
that these

paragraphs provide only a limited discussion of the public interest. For whatever
on

al1 ... aL.IVU

validation of the

§

statute ~""''-' ,

Exhibit C for its discussion of public

the County to "detennine whether
the public interest and [to] enter an order."
Planning
decision. Idaho

is no requirement for

§ 67-6535(b). In other
together, the

Findings
sufficient to demonstrate that

Notice (Exhibit B to Findings) are
the matter and concluded that the public

interest was satisfied.

34). See also summary of statement of Doug Gupton
5 (Exhibit C to Findings at 4» and summary of
statements of Mary and Roger Stover
5 (Exhibit C to Findings at 3». Apparently, Mr. Sopatyk believes that the
to
every statement in its Findings with citatious to the record. There is no such
County is
requirement.
42 For example, see summary of statement of Doug Gupton
5 (Exhibit C to Findings at 4». ("testified
as to the importance of the road for access to recreational areas on the Forest lands"); summary of statement of Dana
Ortlieb (Ex. 5 at 4) ("spoke to the importance of keeping the road open"); summary of statement of Chloe A. Ross
5 at 4) ("For years it has lent public access to Anderson Mountain, Keystone ridge, Smithy Creek, and many
other favorite and well-known spots"; also important for "search and rescue"; "It is the usefulness of the road itself
and the fact that if it were taken away the community and public would be robbed of a precious resource.");
summary of statement by Keating Outfitters (Ex. 5 at 2) (ACR used for "accessing hunting and fishing areas for
their clients"); summary of statement of Richard Shank (Ex. 5 at 2) ("access to Anderson Mountain and mountain
recreation area and to Keystone Ridge"); summary of statement of Toby Friedman (Ex. 5 at 2) ("deep desire that it
remain a public and open road just like it has always been"); summary of statement of Julia Pratt Randolph (Ex. 5 at
182) ("husband and son-in-law also used the road at one point to rescue a woman"); summary of statements of Mary
and Roger Stover (Ex. 5 at 3) ("used it over the course of the last 50 years for access to Forest Service grounds,
recreation, motorcycle riding, walking, and fishing"); summary of statement of Norma Scarborough (Ex. 5 at 3)
("used the road over the course of 54 liz years that she had lived there: horseback riding, walking, hiking, fishing").
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for overturning the County's decision.

Idaho Code § 40-203A sets out the exclusive

Failure to thoroughly describe its reasoning as to the public interest is not among them. The only
question for this Court is whether the record, taken as a whole, contained sufficient "reliable,
probative and substantial information" to support the County's decision to validate and whether
the

U'"""""'JlVU

of

was

or clearly unwarranted exercise
L,""VV1U

amply

C'H"'....r'rt"

the County's

open. 44
; J U " U M J U ' - ' ' ' U. .

'',y

example is

National Forest quoted in section

After all, the Idaho
IS

to

alJ;an(10fl1Iliem 45

ImmUlm2~e

The allegation of bias "E>"'''''' a former commissioner is unfounded
and irrelevant.

nrr,,,,p,rtu ,nt"pf"p'ct"c

43

rpw.,PrI"

in the Gibbonsville area

nrH'tlPV,PT the Court were to find that the
would be to remand for a fuller explanation.

<It"t".'£'t"I''rI

by the validation and

eXt:,lanatlCm of its decision is inadequate, the

44 In addition to the summary of public interest
summarized in Exhibit C to the Findings, note
the following direct testimony and exhibits: Testimony of Julia Randolph, Ex. I, p. 128, n. 15-23; Testimony of
Mary Jordan Stover, Ex. 1, p.140, n. 17-21, p. 143, n.
p.
n. 16-18; Testimony of Roger Stover, Ex. 1, p.
146, n. 15-21, p. 150,1. 19; Testimony of Doug Kelptin, Ex. 1, p.152, n. 17-25, p. 153,11. 1-7; Testimony of Bob
p. 161, n.
Testimony of Dana Roger Ortlieb, Ex.
Gervais, Ex. 1, p. 156,11.25, p. 157,11. 1-5, p. 160, n.
1, p. 161, U. 13-18, p. 164, n. 22-25, p. 165, n.
Testimony of Norma Scarborough, Ex. 1, p. 172, n. 20-25;
Letter of William A. Wood, Ex. 3, C-3; Notarized
Testimony of Bob Vouvier, Ex. 1, p. 177, n. 18-25, p. 178,1.
Letter from Marcus C. Jordan, Ex. 3, C-22-B; Affidavit of Larry Webb, Ex. 3, C-22-C; Affidavit of Robert
Srenersen, Ex. 3, C-22-E; Notarized Statement of Sue Ann Keating, Ex. 3, C-22-F; Notarized Statement of Richard
Shank, Ex. 3, C-22-G; Affidavit of Toby Friedman, Ex. 3, C-22-H; Affidavit of Alfred Stenersen, Ex. 3, C-22-I;
Affidavit of Barbara Stenersen, Ex. 3, C-22-J; Letter from Norma Scarborough, Ex. 4, P-20.

45 S.B. 242, 1963 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 267, § 1 (then codified at Idaho Code § 40-104; later codified at
Idaho Code § 40-203(4); repealed by S.B. 1108 in 1993).
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improvement of ACR." Opening Brief at

46

This allegation is without merit for four reasons.

First, the factual premise is wrong. Former Commissioner Proksch had no improper interest in
the ACR validation proceeding. 47 Next, as a technical matter, the statute Mr. Sopatyk alleges
was violated does not apply to validation proceedings. 48 Third, even if Mr. Proksch were biased
(and

was

did not cast the Oe(~10Jmg vote, and no remand is appropriate under Floyd v.

46 Mr. Sopatyk also states, "Additionally, it appears that Mr. Proksch did not raise his property interests to
the Commissioners during the time they considered the record in rendering the January 24, 2005, Decision"
Opening Brief (referencing Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. 37, 11. 10-15, p. 38, 1. 3». This is yet another blatant
misstatement of the record. The only testimony was that, at the time the deposition was taken, Mr. Proksch did not
recall what disclosures had been made.
Mr. Sopatyk also states, "First, the petition for validation was initially filed by a fonner County Prosecutor
ULJ'vunH< Brief at 25 (citing Ex. 1, p. 266, 11. 9-15 (Tr. 2004 Hearing)). The reference is not to testimony of a
in which counsel speculates about "the genesis of this entire
witness but to a statement by counsel for Mr.
2004
There is no testimonial evidence to support counsel's speculation.
process. Ex. ,p. 266, L 18
Again, Mr. Sopatyk has misled the Court.

Mr. Proksch owns two parcels that Mr. Sopatyk alleges will be benefited by validation of ACR. Mr.
Proksch owns a one-quarter interest in an estate parcel with his three sisters. The property is about one to one and
one-half miles from ACR. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. 9, LIS, p. 11, 11. 5-6, p. 26, 11. 10-12). In addition, he
and his wife own a property near Ditch Creek. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. 9, 11. 11-21, p. 11,11.5-6, p. 15,11.
1-2). The Ditch Creek property is even further from ACR, about four to six miles away. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch
n.
Although the estate parcel could be accessed via ACR, this is not the only means of
Deposition, p.
access.
a portion of the estate parcel is bordered by Highway 93. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch Deposition, p. II, n.
19-22, p.
n.3-4). Moreover, the Ditch Creek parcel is accessed by heading up Hughes Creek and then up Ditch
Creek. Thus, the value of this property will also not be affected by the validation of ACR. Ex. 4, S-C (Proksch
Deposition, p.
11.
Mr. Proksch did not suggest any\vhere in his deposition that either of the properties will
be benefited by making ACR a public road. Mr. Sopatyk's only "evidence" is the testimony of Joe Corlett who has
never even visited the sites. Ex. 2 (Tr. Public Hearing, June 25, 2007 at 3-4). His conjecture that validation would
increase the value of the property failed to take into account the alternative access available to the property.
Moreover, the Commissioners reviewed the evidence presented by Mr. Sopatyk and expressly stated, in their
November
2007 Supplemental Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw that "no evidence was presented to
show that Commissioner Proksch, who voted originally to endorse the validation of Anderson Creek Road, had any
contlict.. ." Supplemental Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw, at 1. We have discovered at the last moment
that this document is not in the record on this appeal. Counsel will file a motion to augment.
48 Mr. Sopatyk's allegation of violation ofIdaho Code § 31-807 A also fails for a significant technical
reason-the statute does not even apply to road validations. Rather, it applies only to purchase and sale transactions
and contracts on behalf of a county: "No member of the board must be interested, directly or indirectly, in property
purchased for the use of the county, nor in any purchase or sale of property belonging to the county, nor in lillY
contract made by the board or other person on behalf of the county, for the erection of public buildings, the opening
or improvement of roads, or the building of bridges, or for other purposes unless otherwise authorized by law."
Idaho Code § 31-807 A (emphasis added). Mr. Sopatyk emphasized the "opening or improvement of roads"
language but failed to realize that it is only relevant in the context of a contract. This is a road validation, not a
"contract made by the board ... for ... the opening or improvement of roads." Thus, this statute does not apply to
the present situation.
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of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,

P.3d 863 (2002).49 Finally,

Mr. Proksch was replaced by a new commissioner after the 2006 election. Thereafter, the
Connty Commission voted again unanimously to validate the road, thus rendering moot any
allegation with respect to the former commissioner. 50
THE £'n,TTL1''''''' IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES; MR. SOPATYK IS NOT.

The Court's recent decisions interpreting the 2010 amendment to
put doubt the County's claims under that
Idaho Code §
statute.
in Smith v. Washington

afTransportation,2010
to recover aWOITtev

2010
4297807 (Idaho
under Idaho

statute which,
't

(Idaho 2010),
0), appear to be at

§1

17.

was a response to the
Idaho

2

49 Even if there were a showing of bias, remand may not be required where the biased commissioner did not
cast a deciding vote. Floyd v. Board o/Commissioners o/Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,725-26, 52 P.3d 863,
870-71 (2002). If the decision would have been the same without the biased vote, there are three factors to consider:
whether the other members were aware of the bias, or the interest was disclosed; (2) the degree of the biased
individual's participation; and (3) the extent of the biased interest. Floyd, 137 Idaho at 726,52 P.3d at 871 (relying
on Griswald v. City a/Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996»). In Floyd, the Court concluded that "due process
would be satisfied ... by simply disregarding Commissioner Christensen's vote rather than nullifying the decision
and remanding the case for rehearing or reconsideration by an entirely new body of Commissioners." Floyd, 137
Idaho at 726,52 P.3d at 871. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the decision of the Commissioners in Floyd to
stand, in the face of proven bias, and favored this result over the option of nullifying and remanding the decision.
Applying the three part test above, it is conceded that Mr. Proksch played a significant role in the hearing as
Chairman and Hearing Officer. However, the other two prongs strongly tilt in favor of no remand. First, there is no
showing that the other commissioners were aware of the parcels in question or influenced by this fact. Second, the
extent of the alleged bias is small. Indeed, the case for Mr. Proksch's bias is not nearly as strong as the bias
evidence in Floyd, which was still not deemed enough to overturn the Commission's decision. Accordingly, if the
Court determines there was bias, the appropriate result is to ignore his vote resulting in 2-0 unanimous decision.
50 Most importantly, the entire matter is now moot. Mr. Proksch is a former Commissioner and no longer a
participant in the validation proceeding. On August 13,2007, following his departure, the new County
Commissioners voted again-unanimously-to validate the road. Thns, any remedy of remanding the matter to the
Commission for a new vote has already been achieved. In the August 13, 2007 public hearing, each of the three
current Commissioners (Robert Cope, Richard Snyder and Brett S. Barsalou) attested individually to having
reviewed the entire record, having no improper interest in the validation of ACR and willing to vote again on a
motion to validate ACR as either public or not public. Each Commissioner subsequently voted "yes" to validate
ACR as a public road on a renewed motion for determination. This decision was made unanimously, without any
improper bias, and should be upheld. Ex. 2 (Tr. Public Hearing, August 13, 2007).
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(2009). Prior to Rammel!, the Coort interpreted Idaho Code § 1
attorney

17 as allowing the award

administrative proceedings and in appeal of administrative proceedings.

Rammel! overturned that line

cases, making attorney fee awards available in appeals from
cases themselves. The Legislature responded
matters as well.
mc:onlDt~tel1t

legislative drafting, the resulting

authority to award attorney fees

appeals

unintended. Review of the legislative
and Administrative
Committee,

1

2010), as

as

admittedly
interpretation is not unreasonable.
rec~onslO,er

and substitute a more

its construction

2010 amendment

nte:rpI'etcLtloln that would better achieve the apparent purpose of the
attorney
§1

17 is available to the County/I the District

reversed, and attorney fees should be awarded on this
appeal as

) states

prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney

fees if the opposing party """'T<>" without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12117(1). The District Court found that Mr. Sopatyk did not act without a reasonable basis because

51 The attorney fee statute could be available either by applying a more liberal reading to the 2010
amendment or by determining not to apply the 2010 amendment retroactively. The 2010 statute states that it is to be
applied retroactively, but that was plainly done in order to expand the availability of attorney fees to cases then
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"[a]ttempts to recreate what occurred over one hundred years ago lend itself to reasonable
disputes." R., pp. 37-38 (Memorandum Decision at 14-15).52 The County agrees it has been
difficult to recreate such extensive history, but maintains the history compiled by the County's
historian is sufficiently
statute

to serve

that Mr. Sopatyk's disputes are unreasonable.
rI",t.,.....",..,t

to groundless or

purpose of this

litigation and to "Tn",,,,
financial burdens defending

gr()U1JlmC~SS

charges."

1<0,'1""'''''' v.

Magic

,1

remedy

" , , , , . 4 L U ••H

11

11

90

these intentions exactly, as it is forced to continue spending
scarce Tnv"",,,,,,..

TTlllnl-"V

at a

budgetary

Sopatyk's

set out
matter.

at the
were

Sopatyk's

and, again,

to be without any foundation. He now pursues this appeal

is little more

with a

Court

a word-for-word recital of the failed arguments he made to the
detailed explanation offered

the County in the briefing

a number of misleading and inaccurate references to the record.

below.
at 1

IO(>tmcne 5 at 1 footnote 6 at 1 footnote 11 at 1

at page
available under Idaho

at 34, footnote

§1

17 both before

footnote 17 at

at 36, and footnote 46 at

.) Fees are

district court and this Court. Lane Ranch

pending. There is a good argument that any restrictive aspect of the statute should not (and constitutionally cannot)
be applied retroactively.
52 This Court "exercises free review over the decision of the district court in applying Idaho Code
§ 12-117," and should grant the County its fees. Fischer v. City o/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091,
1098 (2005).
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145 Idaho

ofSun

v.

91, 1

780 (2007). For these

County meets the standard set forth in Idaho Code
attorney

17(1), and is entitled to its

incurred to date.

D,

The County is entitled to its fees under I.A.R, 11.2.

County is

"'"Tn I """'

to

11

bec:am;e Mr. Sopatyk and/or his
,,~

appeaL J~ Recently,
to

Lattin v. Adams

11.2 and explained that "[a]lthough

not always appear clear from the record, this Court
can infer

the surrounding circumstances."
(citing

v. Liddle

(quoting Neihart
1

1

(2005»). In

this

Appellate Rule 11.2 if it is "not well

held
grounded in

or a good-faith extension, modification, or

reversal of "'A.l"LJlU~

interposed for an improper purpose." Lattin v. Adams

v. Harvey, 147, Idaho 364,

,209 P.3d 661,668
record,

litigation history clearly show that Mr. Sopatyk

COlrltu1Ue:s to
..""<'....

"'''7 to Idaho Code

appeaL (See discussion above with

§1

1

It is apparent that Mr. Sopatyk has forced this litigation to

53 In contrast to Mr. Sopatyk:, the County made its attorney fee claim in its first appellate brief to the
District Court. At the time, it only identified Idaho Code § 12-117, which was then a proper basis for an award.
Given the unforeseen change in law, the County should now be allowed to identify the additional basis ofI.A.R.
12.2. If the Court determines that such a request should be made by motion, the County asks that this portion of the
brief be deemed such a motion. In any event, the Court has authority to award attorney fees under this provision sua
sponte.
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continue over many years in the hope of wearing down the County and forcing it to abandon its
position not because it is wrong but for budgetary reasons. He came very close to succeeding. If
he is not required to pay for his costly and dilatory appeals, others will be encouraged to play the
of chicken with county officials.

same

Sopatyk is not entitled to attorney fees as he failed to make an
appropriate and timely request.
on
now.
he cited the

....u"t ....

~."".

review to the District

but

Sopatyk is not entitled to the attorney fees.
~~~''-'H'U.. he failed to state the basis for the claim. 55 Third,

comes

12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l). Idaho Code § 12-121 allows a grant of
attc)rne,y fees to the
in any
action, and is limited to actions initiated by a complaint. It does not
apply in cases such as this administrative appeal initiated by petition. Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 204
P.3d 1127 (2009). Similarly, I.R.c.P. 54(e)(l) allows an award of attorney fees in "any civil action, and only
v. Bd. OjCounty Comm 'rsjor Ada County, 117 Idaho 1079,
applies to actions initiated by a complaint.
1081-82,793 P.2d 1251,1253-54 (1990).
55 Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that the attorney fees request be made "in the fIrst appellate brief .. "
as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." These rules require the party to "state the basis for the claim." Mr.
Sopatyk's request fails because it does not state any basis. Indeed, the request is devoid of any argument as it
consists of a partial unexplained quotation. This is insufficient. "[A] request for attorney fees should alert
the other party to the basis upon which attorney fees are requested in order that the other party may have a sufficient
opportunity to object." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 149 Idaho 437,235 P.3d 387, 398 (2010) (citing
Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 424, 987 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1999». For Me Sopatyk to be entitled
to recover his fees on appeal, "authority and argument establishing a right to fees must be presented in the fIrst
brief," as "citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is insuffIcient." Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho
171,233 P.3d 102, 118 (2010). See also Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 945,88 P.3d 764 (2004). Me Sopatyk's
request lacks argument, is grossly insuffIcient, and should be excluded from this Court's review.
56 Mr. Sopatyk's request for attorney fees fails is because he did not make the request in his "ftrst appellate
brief," which was to the District Court. Accordingly, his request on this second appeal is too late. The judicial
review to the District Court was subject to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(r), which made the Idaho Appellate
Rules applicable to apply to any procedure not specifted in Rule 84. Because I.R.C.P. 84 does not prescribe a
method for requesting attorney fees, LA.R. 41(a) was applicable.
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CONCLUSION

each of the reasons discussed

the County's decision recognizing ACR as a

public road should be affirmed and the County should be awarded its attorney fees incurred
defending these frivolous appeals.
this 30th day of November, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,
PURSLEY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I
as follows:

that on the

day of November, 2010, the foregoing was served

u. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

RESPONSE BRIEF
1007368_39.5720·9

Page 48 of 103

§~

~oo
,00
"CI
"'0
;.0
:;;e

~oo
~r!1

"'=is
~

Quick Reference to Citations
Quick
Cites

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentiVacation &
Validation (County and Combinedj

-Today:
I.C. §§ 4Q.106, 4Q.109(5) 202(3).
4Q.204A

History:
laws. at p. 578, § 1 (1864),
laws. at p, 677. § 1 (1875),
reak In history
Territory laws. at p, 277. § 1
Territory laws. at p, 162, § 1
- break in history Rev, Stat. of Idaho Terr, §§ 850.851
(1887),
Idaho Sess. laws at p. 12
I,C, Ann, §§ 1137.113
1 Idaho Code Ann. §§
Idaho Ses$, Laws ch. 55
1 Compiled Laws §§ 874. 875
1 Compiled Stat. §§ 1302, 130
391.C, Ann. §§ 39-101.39-103
Idaho Code §§ 40·101, 4Q.l03
Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 82
Idaho Sass. Laws ch. 93
I.C. §§ 4Q.103.4Q.l07
I.C, §§ 4Q.109(5). 4Q.202
I.C, § 4Q.202(3) (1986),
I.C, §§ 4Q.109(5). 4Q.202(3) (1988),
I.C, § 4Q.202(3) (1992).
I.C. §§ 40-106. 40.107 (1993)
- break in hIStory I.C. § 4Q.204A (1993),

'i:i

<§

~

\0

o

"'*l

o
w

Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon &
Validation (Highway Districts)

I

...,
.....
0

~0

8:;::1
g~

,'"",0
."
:<>:z
~'"
t5f'!l

:0=:::
~

OVERVIEW
Road Creation

Formal AbandonmentIVacatlon &
Validation (County and Combined)

Passive Abandonment

Formal Abando!1mentIVacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)

In
oulline.
to mechanisms for abamdoOlneJnt
affirmative.
declaration

outline
abandonment' because
based on the absence of use and
mamtenance rather than affirmative
official action declaring an abandonment.
Some courts and commentators reler to
this as 'infoomal abandonment.
The law since 1893 has provided two
methods of road creation:

Method 1 (formal action;:
"Roads laid out and recorded as
highways by order of a board of
.ommlssloners and all roads used as
slich for a period of five years. providE
the latter shall have been worked and
kept up at the expense of the public or
located and recorded by order ofthe
board of commissioners are highways.

Idaho's first loomel ab'lOdononein!
was enacted

The passive abandonment statute has
been restricted and narrowed
and was finally repealed in
In 1963 the slatute was amended (H B
15) to make it applicable only to roads
created by preSCription. that is. roads
created under Melhod 2 efthe Road
Creation Statute. Arguably. this merely
codified prior
see discussion under
H.B.1S.

Nicolaus v.
section 40-501 to require formal findings
that the road is no longer necessary

In 1986. the Legislature enacted new
formal abandonment provisions for all
roads
section
the left)

Method 2 (public use & maintenance;:
"Roads laid oot and recorded as
highways. by order of a board of
commissioners. and all roads used as
such for a period of fiye years prgvided
the latter shall have been worked and
kept up at the expense of the public or
located and recorded by order ofthe
board of commissioners, are highways, ~
In the current codification. these
in the def.nition
and in the
40-202(3».

""d

~

VI

o

-

In 1993 (H.B. 388) the Legislature
adopted a new section 204A which
declared that "construction and forst use"
are sufficient to create R.S. 2477 rightsof-way.

In the same
S.B. 267 established
mandatory
procedures for
abandonment of roads prOviding aCCess
to public lands
V.

Board of Comm'r s of

County ("Floyd iI? 137 Idaho
718.52 P.3d 863 (2002). recardino the

In 1993 (S.B. 1108) the
repealed the passive abandonment
provision altogether

388 added

section
new

ith R.S. 2477

Among other things. it

section

-~

§I"l
i;;rJJ

,~

"1:l

"'0
"'Z
:::rJJ
~~

iot::d

~""l

OVERVIEW
Road Creation

Passive Abandonment
states that abandonment ~~~c!pl"~
to R.S. 2477.~
See

left

'i::i

~

VI
-'

Formal AbandcmmentNacatlon
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacation
Validation (Highway DIstrlcts)

g::t1

~~
"'0
~~
'::jfJJ
?t'!'1
"'t::=

101'.'-

~

t"I

"'l

Statutes As
Year'"
Today
CITE:

CITE: Idaho Code

NOTE:

§

40-106(3).

~UOTE

"40-106. Definitions - E.

'i::l

~

.....

Abandonment

Road Creation

-(3) 'Expense of the public' means the
expenditure of funds for roadway
maintenance by any governmental
agency, including funds expended by any
agency of the federal government, so long
as the agency allows public access over
the roadway on which the funds were
expended and such roadway is no!
located on federal or stale-owned land.'

Formal AbandonmentlVacatioll 8<
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentlVacation
Validation (Highway Districts)

§~
~oo

I::Oz~
~oo
~t"l

"'=2:!
..,

t"l

Statutes As
Year =
Today

Road Creation

CITE: Idaho Code

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentlVacatlon 8.
Validation (County and Combined)

40-109(5),

QUOTE:
"40-109, Definitions - H

CITE: Idaho Code § 40-204A,

'"t:l

~

VI
W

o
.....,

--

abandoomenl or vacation
whether or not 10 abandon
)lic right of

Formal AbandonmentNacation
Validation (Highway DIstricts)

§~
~[J'J

I~ ~

;,,2:

~~

""t:=

!2t"l

Statutes As They Read

"Ij

Year'"
Today

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacation
Validation (County and Comblne<l)

proceedinos

'i::1

~

.....

nor the
considered a
jllstification for considering these rights-ofio have been abandoned,
l) All ofthe said rights-of-way shall
be shown
some form of documentation
to have
prior to the withdrawal of
the federal grant In 1976 or to predate the
removal of land through wi
from the public domain for
purposes, Documentation
form of a map, an affidavit surveys, books
or other historic information,
-( 4) These rights-ol-way shall not
01
require maintenance for the
vehicular traffic, nor shall any
be
incurred
failure te
maintain
of-way s
user and may be maintained by the public
I usage by the public,
Any member of the public, Ihe
of Idaho and any of Its political
subdivisions, and any agency of the
federal government may choose 10 seek
validation of Its rights under law to use
granted rights-ol-way either tI
process set forth by the state
through processes set forth by any
federal agency or by proclamation of user
rights granted under the prOVisions of the
original act, Revised Statute 2477,
"Persons seeking to have a federal land
)f-way, InCluding those which fumlsh
access to siate an d federal
and waters, validated as a
ilic light-ol-way as part of a
or highway official highway system,
follow the procedure outlined In section

easements may
ued use of
existing sewer, gas, water. or similar
pipelines and appurtenances, or other

Formal AbandonmentNacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)

§~

,

:,,;'"
'"1:1
00

",0
~2
'4

'"

'" !!!j

I:=

!!!!j

Statutes As

""
YearToday

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmenWacatlon &
Validation (County and Combined)
Uf1derarooncl facilities as defined in
ldeho Code. for dttches
appurtenances. and for electric.
and simlar lines and

shall record
acl<nc>WI"dgerrienlls. including supporting
rl"r"'n''''t~t'''" and maintain an
appropliate index of same

'"t:l

~

VI
VI

Formal AbandonmenWacation &
Validation (Highway Distrlctsj

8~

~~

':~2~

CI'l
~r!1

"-i

""=:=
~

Statutes As
Year'"
Today

'i;;1

~

Vl

0\

-

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)

§~
~Cf;J

I~ ~
~~

::3!"'l

"'=e
!"'l

Statutes As

"'l

Year'"
Today

Road Creatiol1

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacation &
Validation (County and Combinedl

and

'"t;j

~

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &.
Validation (Highway DistriCts)

§::tI

~~

I""

"1:1

:<>~

0::]rJ'l
~t;rj

"'1:1:1
~

~

Statutes As
Year '"
Today

'i:J

&5
(I)

VI
00

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacatlon &
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacation
Validation (Highway Dlstrlctsj

§~

woo

&;"'CI

'", 0

"':z
"'00

;:Jr"l

:bt;;::l

:::

~

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

Passive Abandonment

Road Creation

1864

at
QUOTE:

NOTE This
Idaho's
first road statute, cons/sled of a blanket
declaration of all roads then In public use,
with

act

""d

~

-

Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon 11
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentiVacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)

g~
c;Joo

g;'"e

':o:z
w0
~~

~t::::I
~
I'"!
"'l

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

1871:1

Road Creation

hereafter be
of county
their respective

hat in case,
now closed,

NOTE This was the second blanket
declaration, This statute, however.
excluded avoided turning toll
roads,

'i:I

~
('l)

~
o
~
.......

ow

Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentiVacation
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentiVacation
Validation {Highway Dlstrlctsl

§~

g;r.I'J

,'" "='

~o

2:3~
l?~

"'t=

!
!;l

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"'

1881

Road Creation
CITE: Gen. Laws of
p 277. § 1 (1881)

Passive Abandonment
of Idaho, at

QUOTE:
"Section 1 All public highways roops
streets, and thoroughfares, which are Of
have been used as sych at any time

within two Yl!!![li pnor to the passage of
an act entitled

~An

Act concerning roads

trails and public thoroughfares"
approved January 12th 1875. or which
may hereafter be declared such by the
boord of County Commissioners within
!heir resooctjve counties shell b~
considered county roads. All roads or
highways laid out or now traveled or
which have been commonly used by the
public including such as have been
wrongfully closed at any time since
January 12 1873 in the several counties
of this T erritory are hereby declarecj
county roads; excepting however roads
and highways upon which franchises
have heretofore been granted, so long as
the franchise of aoy s\lch road sb§1I
remain in ful! force and effect."
NOTE: This 1881 law restated the
blanket declaration of 1875 and then
included another blanket declaration.
again excluding toll roads

'"'t1

~

0\

.......

o

w

Formal AbandonmentiVacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentiVacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)

-~

St!l

,;:~'"~

"'2
:joo
~~

"'~
C1
t!l

""I

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

Abandonment

Road Creation

1885

CITE: Gen. Laws of
p 162. § 1 (1885)

o/Idaho,

the end ofthe

declares that roads

aller loor years
QUQTE:

'"d

~

(See statute

no looger
left)

Formal AbandonmentlVacation
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentlVacation
Validation (Highway Districts)

-~
§t"'l

..,

:S;IJJ
,'''

,;;;0
~"" :l

g~

~=

i::
t"'l
."

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1887

Road Creation
Rev. Slat.

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

CITE: Rev, Stat. of Idaho TerL
codified at Idaho C
repealed by S,B 1

QUOTE:
QUOTE:

NOTE: This was Idaho's first road
abandonment statute, It was substantially
amended
limited) in 1963, In 1985,
all of Title
was repealed and this
section was

NOTE: This 1887 codification replaced
the earlier territorial road creation statutes
and created the basic statutOI)' format
in sections
which remains in
4()..109(5) and
that as of
1887, there was no
for
maintenance.
The Court explained the
Interaction of the two sections: 'It is clear
that § 850 defines what may
constitute a highway in the State of Idaho,
and that § 851 governs the procedure for
the creation of a highway in the State of
Idaho,' Galli v, Idaho County, 146 Idaho
155, 160, 191 P,3d 233, 238 (2008),

'i:i

~

NO TE: This statute was recodified several
times. but was unchanged unti11985, when
it was repealed
sions in se
Idaho Code §
traced back
Idaho, al p, 162,
but that eartier version of II
not authorize abandonment.

Formal AbandonmentlVacatiQn &
Validation (Highway DIstricts)

§~

g;""

I: ~

"'z
:::;""
~rt"J

:0=i:s
i:"l
'!'j

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1890

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

AbandonmenWaeirtion 8<
Validation (County and Combined)

CITE: Idaho Admission Bill, 26 Stat Sess,

NOTE:

'"t:j

~
.....

July

1890, Idaho was admittad to the

Idaho's Constitution

in

Formal AbandonmenWacation
Validation (Highway DIstricts)

-~
Si"'l
~'Jl

,'" ."

wO

:2
g~

,:,,=
i:':

i"'l
"'l

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"
1893

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmenWacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

CITE. 1893 Idaho Sess. Laws a l l 2.
(then codified at Rev. Stat.
851: codified
amended
§§
and 4()"202(3))

NOTE: The 1893 Amendment contained
only a single change to the 1887
Codification. It left section 850
unchanged. The only substant
was to add the maintenance reouirement
to section 851.

numerous minor
NOTE.
amendments, the
provisions of sections 850 and 851, as
amended in 1893. remain nearly identical
today. They are now codified
(redundantly) in sections 40-109(5) and
40-202(3).
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Historical Statutes and Amendments

Year'"
1901

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

No change In

NOTE: No change in

.....

Formal AbandonmentNacatlon &
Validation [County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacatlon &
Validation {Highway Districts}
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"'
1908

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

CITE 1 Idaho Code Ann §§
as amended at
and 40-202(3»

QUOTE:

QUOTE
'''~-I4;}''JiJll~. Abandonment of

A
worked or used for
of five years ceases to be a
highway for

purpose whatever

NOTE: No change in language

by order
board of
and all roads
used as such
a period of five years,
provided the later shall have been worked
01 the
and kept up at the
or located and
by order
board of commissioners. are hig!"
Whenever any corporation owning a
bridge, or a tump'lke, plank, or cornmon
wagon road is dissolved or discontinues
the road
or has expired by
limitation, the
or
highway'
co!TlITlls!~Orlers,

NOTE: No change in langu8ge.
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year1911

Road Creation
191" Idaho Sess, Laws ch, 55,
District Act of 1(11) (not

NOTE: This 1911 statute
creation of highway d
time, Its Introductory
contained a deficit I
above) based on a
of the
in section 1137 The
1138 did not
in
In subsequent
code reverted to the language
1137 and 1138,
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Formal AbanclonmentNacation
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"
1919

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

worked or used for the

offive years ceases to
any purpose
NOTE:

NOTE: No change in language

-'

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (ColJnty and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentIVacCltion &
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

1921

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentJVacation &
Validation (County and Combined)
CITE:

IdahoSess<
codified at C,
later codified
codified as amended
§ 40-604)

The board of County
Commissi"ners< by proper actinances<

-3< Cause to be recaded as
such roads as have become
or abandonment to the public<
-4< Abolish a abandon such as are

NOTE: Subsection olthe session
(' This Inconsistent
subsequent stalemen!s of

an errOL
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
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Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacation 11
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacation 11
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1932

Passive Abandonment

Road Creation

Formal AbandonmentNacation &.
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacation &.
Validation (Highway DistriCts)
CITE 39 Idaho Code Ann, § 39·1524
amended at

CITE:
and

QUOTE:
are
streets or
laid out or erected by
the public, or
out or erected
others, dedicated or abandoned

_
worked or
period of five years ceases to
be a highway for any purpose whatever'
NOTE: No change in language,

'Jj-'~~~~Ui!:.ll~=-, Recorded
laid out
by order of the
board
and all roads
used as such for a period of five years,
provided the later shall have been worked
and kept up at the expense of the public
or located and recorded by order of the
board of commissioners, are hlghwa
Whenever any corporation owning a
bridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common
wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues
the road or bridge, or has expired by
limitation, the bridoe or
highway,'
NOTE No change In language,
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"
1943

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmenWacation &
Validation (County and Combined)
CITE: SS,
1943ldahoSess,
i (then codified at Idaho Code
later codified at Idaho Code

as
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Formal AbandonmenWacation
Validation (Highway Distrlctsl
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"

Road Creation

1948

Passive Abandonment
CITE:

as amended at
and 4()'202(3)1
QUOTE:

Code §

QUOTE
Abandonment
road not worked or used
period of frve years ceases to
highway for any purpose whatever,
NOTE: No change

NOTE: The Idaho Code was created in
1948. Former Title 39 was reclassified to
Title 40. No change in language.
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1950

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmenWacation &
Validation (County and Combined}
CITE: The

1950. S.B.
§§
QUOTE:
QUOTE:
"Section 2. H,GHWAYS DEFINED. Highways are hereby defined U foads.
streets. _lIey,;, and bridges. laid out or
_~stablished for the public, or4
leiS ,,~I <If @restes 8y ether.;. dedicated or
abandoned to the public. Such highwa'{1i
shall include necessary culverts sluices
drains dit.hes waterways
embankments retaining walls. bridge§
tunnels grade ssparation stryctyres
foadside improvements pedestrian
facjlrties and any other structures Of
fixtures jncidental to the Qresjlrvation or
improvement of such highw8)l!!,:
NOTE: S.R 62 established the slate
department Section 24 olthe
.Ied the definition section (section
and replaced it with the
~d section 2 quoted above. The
on road
1950 Act contained no
creation or passive ab"nejoomEmi.
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"

1951

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacation 8.
Validation (County and Combined)

NOTE: The 1951 Act restated the
of county commissioners to abandon
roads as provided in the 1950 AcL
• requirement for
action
public Interest
NOTE: The
redundant) statement of
40-S()1 remained on the
when bath provisions were replaced
section
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

1961

Passive Abandonment

Road Creation

and

"Section 40·107. Highways defined. Highways are hereby defined as roads.
streets. alleys and bridges. laid out or
established for the public or dedicated Or
abandoned to the public. Such
shall include necessary cUlverls.
drains. ditches. waterways.
embankments. retaining walls. bodges.
tunnels. grade separation structures.
roadside improvements. pedestrian
facilities. and any other structures. works
or fixtures Incidental to the preservation
improvement of such highways.'
NOTE: This is the re-codification
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implements the 1950 and 1951 Acts by
section 40·101 with 40·107
was unchanged.

Formal AbandonmentNacation 8.
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments

1"1

Year"
1963

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmenWacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmenWacatlon &
Validation (Highway Districts)

HR 15" 19631dahoSess

{then codified at Idaho Code
or codified at

QUOTE:
"40-104" ABANDoNMENT OF HIGHWAYS-

A
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ow

NOTE: S.R 243" the companion bill
S.R 242"
to roads
by
'Y
It also esl:ablist,ed
orocedures for abandonment
is Involved. This
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1963

Road Creation

Abandonment

NOTE:
limitation to
in H.B. 15. More
signifl,carrtlv. it added formal procedures
for
when access
lands Is involved. Note that S. B.
did
same thing for highway districts

NOTE. This item is listed under the
lassive" abandonment column, because
amends the passive abandonment
slatute. However. S.B. 242 added formal
abandonment requirements to the passive
abandonment
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"

Road Creation

1985

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacation 8.
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNaciltion 8.
Valldatlon !Hlghway Districts)

QUOTE:

court
~!l1!t.hlg/lway

same manner in

nol be
encroachment or
obstruction restricting
installation of signs or
tend to restrict or prohibit public use
NOTE: Recodified section
section
Changes in language
were
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

1985

Road Creation

NOTE: H,B, 265 repealed aU of Title 40,
it with a new title. Note that the
reiterates the provisions of
section 40-202,

'i;;I

~

00

N

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentIVacatlon &
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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Year
1986

Passive Abandonment

Road Creation

laid out and
by order of a
and ail ~
of five

recorqe(]._~_"""

c""nm,.",mAICS

or

waters, no person may encroach

Ihem and reslnet

use
NOTE: H,B, 556 expanded former
section 4()-202, The old "creation' section
became subsection
New
at the end
40-202(3)
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lere is
not on the
map. H.B.
not amend the definition section

(section 4()-109(5)).

NOTE:

Formal AbandonmentNacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentNacation 8.
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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Year"
HISS

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentNacatlon .&
Validation (County and Combined)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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Road Creation

Passille Abandonment

Formal AbandonmenWacation &
Validation (County and Combinedl

Formal AbandonmenWacatlon &
Validation (Highway Districts)

-:=
S['!l

~,."
I'" "'CI

~~
::3""
?r:rJ

"'t:i::!

~

"'l

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

Road Creation

HISS

Abandonment

CITE:

"40-202. DESIGNATlONOF

laid out and recorded.

all
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Formal AbandonmentIVacation &
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (Highway DIStlicts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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Passive Abandonment

the

on

NOTE: The 1988 Amendments deleted
obsolete provisions dealing wllh former
roads,
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1992

Passive Abandonment

Road Creation
H.B. 627. 1992 Idaho Sess. laws
1 (codified as amended at Idaho

QUOTE'
'40-202. DESIGNA110N OF HIGHWAYS.

opened
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19921dano Sess
Idaho Code

Formal AbandonmentiVacation 8.
Validation (County and Combined)

Formal AbandonmentiVacation 8.
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

1992

Creation

Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon &
Validation (County and Combinedj
section and
persO!1s
proceeding.
completion

cause any
resolution to be recorded the
county records and the official map o!the
to be amended as
ab"ncloolmeni and Vllcatioo.
Of

AlL .,CY:tt1\th\
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"

PassivE! Abandonment

Road Creation

1993

CITE: S.B. 1108. 1993ldahoSess.

eM

(codified at Idaho Code

QUOTE:

"40-202. DeSIGNATION OF HIGHWAYS.illiQ

NOTE: The above amendment had
effect of repealing the passive road
abandonment procedure
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1108 added a

definition

Formal AbandonmentNacation &
Validation (County and Combinedl

Formal AbandQnmentNacatloo &
Validation (Highway Districts)
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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Year
1993

Passive Abandonment

Road Creation

Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon &
Validation (County and Combined)

QUOTE:

the commissioners

CITE: H"B. 388, 1993 Idaho
§§ 40-107(5)" 40-204A)

(codified as amended alldaho

NOTE" The full text of section 204A as amended" is
"Statutes as they read today,,"

the heading

NOTE: H.8" 388 added a new definition for "federal land
40-107(5) which defines them in terms oflhe federal stal
added a new section 204A dealing with R.s 2477 riQihts-of.-WEIY
important proviSions" section 40-204A(1)
and first use" are
suffiCient to accept R.S" 2477 rights-of-way
40-204A(2) states Ihat
abandonment principles do not apply to R"$,, 2477 lights-of-way"
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Validation (Highway Districts)
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1993

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentlVacatlon &
Validation (County and Combined)

abandonment and vacation.

1108, 1993 Idaho SeS$,

6 (codified

QUOTE

'i:i

Il;)

~

--

Idaho

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (Highway Districts)

§~
~f'JJ

I: ~

"'z
~f'JJ
l?tTJ

"'=
~"!l

Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year"'
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Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentlVacation &
Validation (Highway Distrlctsj
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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Year'"

1993

Formal AbandonmentiVacatlon 8.
Validation (Highway Districts)

Road

NOTE:

1108 also added a new

CITE: 8.B. 1108, 1993 Idaho Sess.
ch.412. 7 (codifled at Idaho Code
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OUOTE
-40-604. DUTfESANO POWERS OF
COMMISSIONERS. Commissioners shall:

-~
St"'l

~(I';

,':to
" ."
~~

'" t"'l

:i;=

e:

Historical Statutes and Amendments
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1993

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

Formal AbandonmentIVacatlon &
Validation (County and Combined)

section 4IHl04( 4) must be exercised
to the procedures spelled out
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
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1994
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
Year'"
1995

Road Creation

Passive Abandonment

CITE: S.8. 1117. 1995 Idaho Sass
(codified at Idaho Code

Added hyphens to "right-ai-way

and
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Historical Statutes and Amendments
2000

Road Creation

NOTE: Eliminated references to highway
map.
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Other Provisions

on Road Creation and Abandonment

Citation

Comment

CITE: lUI. 1108. 1993 Idaho Bess.
eh. 412. § 1 (codified Idaho Code

§
Idaho Sass.
Idaho Code
CITE: 1998 Idaho Sess.

Res. No. 136.
CITE: S.B. 1408.2000 Idaho Bess.
ch. 252 § 1 (codified at Idaho Code
40-117)

maintenance

CITE: Idaho Code
1985 Idaho Sess.

NOTE: H.B. 265 also added
below

section

QUOTE
"40-2319.

either to remCMl

'i:I

~
IS
-'

o>-+;
.......

court an action to abate the encroachment as a nuisance.
up
hundred fifty dollars
encroachment abated.
action and remOlfflI.
after Ihe notice

encroachment

c;!::t:l
2jEol
~'"

':~:z~
.-J

'"

~t'!j

"'t:!:1

!~

Other Provisions Bearing on Road Creation and Abandonment
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Citation

Comment
recover costs and expenses. as
was complete."
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